

## U.S. Report Says Soviet Attempts Deception on Its Nuclear Strength

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WASHINGTON, Sept. 25 — A report by the Carter Administration on Moscow's compliance with the 1972 strategic arms accord has concluded that in recent years the Soviet Union has made several apparent attempts to deceive the United States on the size and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal.

The report says that the United States has not charged Moscow with formal violation of the 1972 agreements, which bar deliberate concealment, and that, in most cases, questions of Soviet compliance have been resolved on a satisfactory basis. But critics of the new treaty on limitation of strategic arms contend that the report demonstrates that Moscow cannot be relied on to live up to the terms of the accord.

The discussion of Soviet attempts at deception appears in a secret report prepared by the National Security Council for use by the Senate Intelligence Committee in the debate over the new arms treaty. The report, which has been obtained by The New York Times, gives a list of 11 attempts by the Soviet Union to conceal various aspects of its missile and strategic submarine programs from American surveillance.

### Dummy Missile Sites Reported

Some of the Soviet efforts at deception, the report says, were under way before the negotiation of the 1972 arms accords, which, like the new treaty, prohibit "deliberate concealment measures" that could impede attempts to monitor compliance. For example, Moscow, since 1966, is said to have engaged in building dummy missile sites and dummy submarines to confuse American intelligence.

In 1970, the report says, the Russians started construction of three tunnels at naval bases "apparently for submarine berthing to provide protection against attack and to deny information on readiness status."

The report says that while the Russians "have long practiced concealment and deception in the activities of their military forces," Moscow's efforts to hide details of their strategic programs "increased substantially" in 1974, two years after the conclusion of the first arms accords. During that year, the report says, the Government detected "broad efforts" by Moscow to conceal its mobile missile program, the construction of strategic submarines and the production of land-based rockets.

### Issue Raised at 1973 Meeting

The report says that American negotiators, disturbed by the Soviet activities, brought them up at a meeting in early 1975 of a American-Soviet commission on treaty compliance. Although the Ford Administration did not charge Moscow with violating the 1972 accords, the report says, American officials "proposed that the Soviet side cease these concealment activities."

Moscow, according to the report, denied any effort to evade the arms accords. While the question was still under discussion, the report says, careful analysis of intelligence data led American officials to conclude in April 1975 that Moscow had cut back on its concealment activities. As a result, the issue was dropped.

The report, which outlines several other exchanges with Moscow over treaty compliance, is said by Senate aides to have provided ammunition for both supporters and critics of the new arms treaty. Critics, noting that Soviet deception efforts appeared to have reached a peak after the 1972 accords were signed, contend that the report demonstrates Moscow's continuing willingness to evade the restrictions of arms agreements.

Since the new treaty goes much further than the 1972 agreements in imposing limits on the size and performance of missile and bomber forces, the opponents maintain that Moscow would have more opportunities to cheat.

However, supporters of the treaty maintain that the ability of the United States to detect possible Soviet cheating efforts, as documented by the report, provides proof that the new accord could be adequately monitored.

### 'Seven Years of Experience' Cited

This is clearly the conclusion of the report itself, which states that "the United States has had nearly seven years of experience in monitoring activities and verifying compliance with the provisions of the SALT agreement."

"During that period," it continues, "we have established and confirmed the effectiveness of a mechanism for reporting, analyzing and making policy decisions regarding compliance-related activities."

While it stresses that most questions over Soviet compliance have been resolved to the satisfaction of American officials, the report indicates that one longstanding issue concerning Moscow's activities has yet to be settled. This concerns whether Moscow has lived up to a complicated provision in the 1972 accords, which said that if the Soviet Union wished to deploy more than 740 submarine-launched missiles, it had to deactivate older, land-based rockets.

In 1978, it says, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union had deployed 791 submarine-launched missiles without fully deactivating 51 older, land-based rockets.